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SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSION, SALT
LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, and
SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
The

appellants

declaration that

§§

brought

this

action

15-18-3,

15-18-4, 15-18-5, 15-18-7, and 15-18-8,

Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County,

seeking

the

lower

court's

1966, violate the laws and

Constitution of the State of Utah and the Constitution of the United
States, and further seeking the lower court's order permanently enjoining the enforcement of said sections.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Having reviewed the parties'

joint motion for summary judgment,

stipulated facts and respective memoranda of points and authorities, the
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Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge,
rendered its Memorandum Decision denying appellants' motion for summary
judgment and granting respondents' motion for summary judgment.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek to have the lower court's Memorandum Decision
reversed,

appellants' motion for summary judgment granted, §§ 15-18-3,

15-18-4, 15-18-5, 15-18-7, and 15-18-8 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake County declared unlawful and unconstitutional, and the enforcement
of said sections permanently enjoined.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, on November
20, 1978, enacted Title 15, Chapter 18 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake County (ROSLCO), 1966, as amended (hereinafter "massage ordinance"),
which ordinance was to become effective on December 6, 1978.
lants,

being

entities

real

parties

in

interest

as

The appel-

unincorporated

business

under the laws of the State of Utah whose rights and legal

relations were affected by the newly enacted massage ordinance, filed a
complaint with the lower court on December 5, 1978, seeking that court's
declaration that §§ 15-18-3, 15-18-4, 15-18-5, 15-18-7, and 15-18-8 of
the massage ordinance violate the laws and Constitution of the State of
Utah and the Constitution of the United States, and further seeking that
court's order permanently enjoining the enforcement of said sections.
Additionally,
temporary

on December 5,

restraining

temporarily

enjoining

order,
and

1978,

appellants

which motion was

restraining

filed

a

motion for a

granted,

and an order

respondents

from

enforcing the
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2

massage ordinance issued on the same date, upon the signature of the
Honorable David B. Dee, Judge.
lated to the continuance of

On December 14, 1978, the parties stiputhe temporary restraining order,

as it

applied to § 15-18-5(1) and (2) of the massage ordinance, and agreed to
present arguments on the issues of law raised by appellants' complaint
by means of a joint motion for summary judgment, and further agreed to

stipulated facts for purposes of summary judgment.

Oral arguments were

presented before the trial court on August 27, 1979, supplemented by
extensive memoranda.

The trial court entered its Memorandum Decision

under the pen of the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding Judge,
which

decision

denied

appellants'

motion

for

summary

judgment

and

granted respondents' motion for summary judgment and which decision set
aside the restraining order effective December 19, 1979j at 5:00 P.M ..
Appellants

filed

their notice of appeal, certificate, designation of

record on appeal and appeal bond with the lower court on December 19,
1979..

Additionally, on December 19, 1979, appellants filed with this

Court a motion seeking the restoration of the restraining order for the
pendency of the appeal.

On December 21, 1979, counsel for both parties

met with the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins in chambers for the purpose of
presenting informal arguments relative to whether the restraining order
should be restored for the interim period prior to this Court's ruling
on appellants' motion.

An order issued that day restraining respondents

from enforcing § 15-18-5(1) of the massage ordinance, said order to run
until January 7, 1980.

A hearing was had on appellants' motion before

this Court on January 7, 1980, and based upon the parties' oral arguments and appellants' memorandum, appellants' motion was granted and the
restraining order, as i t applied to § 15-18-5 ( 1) of the massage ordinance,
was restored for the pendency of the appeal.
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The sections of the massage ordinance challenged herein or otherwise referred to read as follows:
For the purpose of this
Sec. 15-18-1. Definitions.
shall
have the meanings
chapter the following terms
prescribed:
(2) ''Masseur" shall mean any person who
gives massages for hire; provided that any person
who is duly licensed by the Department of Registration to practice the healing arts shall not be
included in this definition.
(4) "Employee" means the operator, owner, or
manager of a massage establishment and any person
performing massages at or on the premises of a
massage establishment and also any agent or independent contractor who gives massages at a massage
establishment.
Sec. 15-18-3. Requirements for the Issuance of a License.
Each individual desiring a massage establish(1) Be an
ment license er a masseur license shall:
individual at least 21 years of age.
Sec. 15-18-4. Sanitary Premises. All applications for
a massage establishment license shall be referred to
the Salt Lake City-County Board of Health for investigation and a license shall be granted only after a
finding by the Salt Lake City-County Board of Heal th
that the proposed premises are sanitary enough to
conduct business therein without jeopardizing the
public health.
Sec. 15-18-5.
prohibited:

Prohibited Acts.

The following acts are

(1) It shall be unlawful for a masseur to
administer, for hire, to any person of the opposite sex, a massage, a fomentation, or a bath. It
shall be unlawful for any massage establishment to
cause or permit in or about his place of business,
an employee to administer a massage upon any person of the opposite sex. This section shall not
apply to any treatment administered by any person
licensed to practice a healing art or profession
under the provisions of Utah code Annotated, 1953,
or any other law of this state.
(2) It shall be unlawful to serve, to store,
or allow to be consumed, any alcoholic beverages
on the licensed premises of a massage establishment.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(3) It shall be unlawful for a masseur to
touch or offer to touch or massage the genitalia
of customers.

Sec. 15-18-7. Civil Sanctions.
Any unlawful conduct,
whether the omission to perform an act required by this
ordinance, or the performance of an act prohibited by
this ordinance, shall be cause for revocation or suspension of a massage establishment's license or masseur's
license. The holder of a massage establishment license
may have his or her license revoked or suspended for
any and all violations of the provisions of this ordinance committed by his or her employees.

Sec. 15-18-8. Penal Sanctions.
The person convicted
of violations of this chapter of the Revised Ordinances
of Salt Lake County may be fined not to exceed $299.00,
imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail not to exceed
six months, or both.

ARGUMENT
The

massage

ordinance

challenged ·herein

represents

Salt

Lake

County's most recent attempt at reaching the criminal offense of prostitution through enactment of an ordinance designed to suppress and prohibi t

the legitimate business of massage parlors.

The County's prior

efforts of this sort have been struck down as being "vague and uncertain,"

"not

subject

to regulation by the County," and "not a proper

exercise of the police power," Jensen v. Salt Lake County,
(Utah

1974);

seurs without

"creating

530 P. 2d 3

irrational differentiations," "punishing mas-

trial and conviction," and as "arbitrary and unreason-

able," Hart Health Studio v. Salt Lake County, 577 P.2d 116 (Utah 1978)e
The

appellants

contend

that

the newly enacted massage ordinance

again suffers from the above-cited defects and other impairing defects,
making said ordinance invalid and unenforceable, more specifically set
out as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT I
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
EXCEEDED ITS DELEGATED SCOPE OF AUTHORITY IN ENACTING
§ 15-18-5(1) OF THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE AND SAID SECTION IS
THEREFORE INVALID AND UNENFORCEABLE.
A.

SECTION 17-5-27,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
(1953), AS AMENDED, DELEGATES COUNTIES THE
AUTHORITY TO LICENSE MASSAGE PARLOR BUSINESSES SOLELY, FOR PURPOSES OF REGULATION
AND REVENUE -- NOT FOR PURPOSES OF SUPPRESSION AND PROHIBITION.

The underlying purpose and objective of the Salt Lake County Commission's enactment of

§§

15-18-5(1), 15-18-7, and 15-18-8 of the massage

ordinance, which sections make the administration of a massage by a
licensed masseur or masseuse upon any person of the opposite sex unlawful and subject to civil and penal sanctions, is to reach the criminal
offense of prostitution through the suppression and prohibition of massage parlor businesses.
It is contended by respondents that two statutory grants of authority,

§

17-5-27, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended (UCA), discussed

herein, and

§

17-5-77, UCA, discussed infra at Point I-B, authorize the

County to enact the massage ordinance in question.

The appellants con-

tend, however, that the County has significantly exceeded these delegated grants of authority.
Section 17-5-27, UCA, provides in relevant part as follows:
License business for regulation and revenue -- They
(County Commissioners) may license for purposes of regulation and revenue all and every kind of business not prohibited by law • . • they may license, tax, regulate, suppress and prohibit billiard, bagatelle, pigeonhole, or
any other tables or implements kept or used for similar
purposes, also pin alleys or tables, and ball alleys,
dancing halls • .
(Emphasis added.)
While it is clear from the above statute, and appellants so concede,
that the County may license the business of massage parlors, just as it
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may license "all and every kind of business, n it is equally clear that
the County's licensing authority is statutorily limited, not absolute.
Under the doctrine of statutory construction, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, the express mention of one matter excludes all other
similar

matters

not

mentioned.

Rio Grande Motor Way, Inc. v. Public

Service Commission, 445 P.2d 990 (Utah 1968);
v. Island Ranching Coo,

Great Salt Lake Authority

414 P.2d 963 (Utah 1966);

of Education of Emery County School,

116

P.2d

936

and Hansen v. Board
(Utah 1941).

Thus,

properly construed, § 17-5-27 delegates the County authority to use its
licensing power, in the case of businesses in general, for purposes of
"regulation and revenue" and, in the case of those businesses expressly
named
of

(~,

"billiard, bagatelle . •

"suppression and prohibition."

e ")'

for the additional purposes

Since massage parlors are not in-

cluded among those businesses expressly named, massage parlors can be
licensed only for the purposes of regulation and revenue:

the County is

without authority to suppress and prohibit.
The appellants submit that § 15-18-5 (1)

of the massage ordinance

goes beyond the area of regulation into the areas of suppression and
prohibition.

As

has

been

stipulated

to,

there are approximately 140

licensed masseurs in Salt Lake County, of which approximately 130 are
women, and the vast majority of massage parlor patrons are men.
Stipulated Facts, nos. 6 and 7.)

(See,

Given the opposite sex massage prohibi-

tion of § 15-18-5(1), combined with the sanctions of §§ 15-18-7 and 1518-8, nearly 95% of the massage parlors and masseurs will be driven out
of business as a direct result of the massage ordinance.

This is sup-

pression and prohibition, not regulation.
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A case analogous to the instant case in that it, too, raises the
significant distinction between regulation and prohibition is Combined
Communications Corporation v. City and County of Denver,
(Co 1o •

There,

19 75) •

the

542

p 2d
0

79

Supreme Court of Colorado had occasion to

examine a city ordinance prohibiting erection of new outdoor advertising
and, in that case, as in the instant case, the city's grant of authority
spoke only of

regulation and not of prohibition.

The court stated:

Under a concept of reasonableness, the charter authorization of regulation does not permit (the municipality)
to prohibit this entire industry. At
542 P.2d 83.
The court, citing authorities, went on to hold:
that the power to regulate does not include
'any power, express of inherent, to prohibit.'
At
542 P.2d 84. (Emphasis added.)
The holding in Combined Communications Corporation, supra, is consistent with Winther v. Village of Weippe, 430 P. 2d 689

(Idaho 196 7),

wherein the Supreme Court of Idaho stated the general rule as to municipalities' authority to license and regulate:
It is the general rule that where authority to
license and regulate a business is granted by the
legislature
to
a municipality,
the regulations
adopted must not be unreasonable, unjust or unduly
oppressive (citations omitted) E.£E. • • • such as to
be prohibitory (citations omitted)o
At 430 P.2d
695. (Emphasis added.)
In sum, although § 15-18-5(1) of the massage ordinance is couched
in the disguising language of a licensing mechanism, the true purpose is
to reach the criminal offense of prostitution through the suppression
and prohibition of the legitimate business of massage parlors, and appellants

submit,

based

on the general

principles of

statutory con-

struction and the above-cited authorities, that the County in enacting
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§

15-18-5(1) has exceeded its delegated scope of authority under § 17-5-

27,

UCA,

and said section must be found

B.

invalid and unenforceable.

SECTION 17-5-77, UCA, DELEGATES COUNTIES
THE AUTHORITY TO USE THE POLICE POWER TO
IMPROVE MORALS, PEACE AND GOOD ORDER -BUT ONLY WHERE "NECESSARY AND PROPER" AND
§ 15-18-5 (1) OF THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE IS
NEITHER NECESSARY NOR PROPER.

In addition to the grant of authority claimed under§ 17-5-27, discussed supra, the County contends that the general police power delegated under § 17-5-77 authorizes the County's enactment of
of the massage ordinance.

§

15-18-5(1)

The appellants contend, however, that the use

of the police power is statutorily limited to situations where such use
is necessary and proper and that

§

15-18-5(1) of the massage ordinance

is neither necessary nor proper.
Section 17-5-77, UCA, provides in relevant part as follows:
Ordinances -- Power to enact -- Penalty for violation
The board of county commissioners may pass all ordinances
and rules and make all regulations, not repugnant to
law, •
such as are necessary and proper to . . . improve the morals, peace and good order . . • of the
county and inhabitants thereof. (Emphasis added.)
(i)

SECTION 15-8-5(1) IS NOT NECESSARY.

As was stated supra at Point I-A, the underlying purpose and objective of the opposite sex massage prohibition of
couched

in

terms of a licensing ordinance,

offense of prostitution.

§

15-18-5(1), although

is to reach the criminal

The appellants submit that no additional ordi-

nance is necessary to proscribe prostitution specifically or illicit
sexual activity in general.
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The area of prostitution is comprehensively covered by the Utah
§ 76-l~-1302,

Criminal Code:

ing a Prostitute;"

§ 76-10-1304,

"Exploiting Prostitution;"
of

Prostitution."

illicit

sexual

"Prostitution;"

"Aiding a Prostitute;"

§ 76-10-1305,

and § 76-10-1306, "Aggravated Exploitation

Additionally,

activity:

§ 76-5-403, · "Sodomy;"

§ 76-10-1303, "Patroniz-

76-5-401,

§

and

the Utah Criminal code covers other

§

76-5-404,

"Unlawful

Sexual Intercourse;"

"Forcible Sexual Abuse."

Salt Lake County Ordinances cover prostitution as well, at

§

The

16-23-3,

and general sexual offenses, at § 16-23-1, et seq.
The above offenses, in addition to fin es, carry penal ties ranging
from imprisonment terms of 0 to 6 months to imprisonment terms of not
less than 1 nor more than 15 years.
These statutes and ordinances, if appropriately enforced, are more
than adequate to control prostitution, and no additional proscription of
prostitution is necessary.

The respondents' contention to the contrary,

that the opposite sex massage prohibition of § 15-18-5 (1) is necessary
to combat pros tu ti on because the above-cited laws are ineffective, is
!otally

without

Morgan,

(~,

merit.

In

this

regard,

the

suggestion

by

Captain

Stipulated Facts) that it "takes much more time as far as

investigation is

concerned than is justified by the outcome," speaks

much more to the ineffectiveness of the investigators and the courts'
reluctance to impose jail sentences than it does to any inherent inadequacies in the laws.
Moreover, in addition to the several above-referred-to statutes and
ordinances aimed at controlling prostitution and other illicit sexual
activity, the County has enacted § 15-18-5(3) of the massage ordinance.
Section 15-18-5(3), not challenged herein, provides as follows:
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(3)

It shall be unlawful for a masseur to touch or
of fer to touch or massage the genetalia of
customerse

This section of the massage ordinance would provide additional, although
not necessary,
massage parlors..

proscription of prostitution and is aimed directly at
There is no purpose furthered by

§

15-18-5(1) of the

massage ordinance that is not met by § 15-18-5(3) of the same ordinanceG
So

that,

even ignoring

covering the same area,
§

the several

external

statutes and ordinances

the massage ordinance itself internally makes

15-18-5(1) totally unnecessary.
In sum, the existing laws designed to combat prostitution are suffi-

cient to further the County's desire to improve morals, and these laws
need only to be more effectively enforced and the punishment more effectively

administered.

Moreover,

with

the

additional proscription of

illicit sexual activity found in § 15-18-5(3) of the massage ordinance,
§

15-18-5(1) is totally unnecessary and its enactment, is thus outside

the County's delegated scope of authority under § 17-5-77, UCA, and said
section must be found invalid and unenforceable.

(ii) SECTION

15-18-5(1) IS AN IMPROPER
EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER.

In addition to the County's use of the police power in enacting
§

15-18-5 ( 1) of the massage ordinance being unnecessary as discussed

supra, its use is also improper.
A case on point is Jensen v. Salt Lake County, supra, wherein an
earlier version of the Salt Lake County massage ordinance was challenged
as being an improper exercise of the police power.

The Utah Supreme

Court, in reaching its holding, reasoned as follows:
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At the trial in the court below a county commissioner and
a member of the county sheriff's office testified that
prostitution was the major concern in the adoption of the
ordinance in question.
It is the County's contention
that it is a valid exercise of police power to regulate
massage establishments and to control prostitution. We
are of the opinion that the County does have the power to
deal with those matters directly. However, the ordinance
under consideration does neither, but rather it attempts
to set standards and qualifications of those persons who
intend to engage in a legitimate occupation or trade.
This is not a proper exercise of the police power. At 530
P.2d 4. (Emphasis added.)
The Court concluded that the County's attempt to indirectly control
prostitution through a licensing ordinance for massage parlors was an
improper exericse of the police power, and further concluded that if the
County wants to control prostitution, it has the power to do so, but it
must exercise the power "directly."
The present massage ordinance suffers from the same sort of attempt
to "indirectly" control prostitution through the licensing, in this case
suppression and prohibition, of massage parlorse

The opposite sex mas-

sage prohibition of § 15-18-5(1), like the high standards and qualifications demanded of masseurs by the massage ordinance challenged in
Jensen, supra, is an improper exercise of the police power because the
County has failed to directly deal with the matter of controlling prostitution and instead has prohibited the acts of a legitimate occupation
with the intended purpose of having an indirect effect on prostitution.
In conclusion as

to

Point

I,

the County exceeded its delegated

authority in enacting § 15-18-5(1) of the massage ordinance because said
section is not for the purpose of regulation but for the purposes of suppression and prohibition, contrary to § 17-5-27, UCA, and because said
section is neither necessary nor proper, contrary to § 17-5-77, UCA, and
thus said section must be found invalid and unenforceable.
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POINT II
SECTION 15-18-5(1) OF THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE IS INCONSISTENT WITH AND IN CONFLICT WITH COMPREHENSIVE STATE LAWS
REGULATING CRIMINAL SEXUAL ACTIVITY IN THAT SAID SECTION,
COMBINED WITH SECTION 15-8-8, ATTEMPTS TO MAKE CRIMES OF
ACTS WHICH ARE NOT CRIMES UNDER STATE LAW.
Section 15-18-5(1) of the massage ordinance provides that the administration of a massage by a licensed masseur upon any person of the opposite sex is unlawful and, under § 15-8-8,
penal sanctions.

the off ender is subject to

Thus, in effect, the massage ordinance makes an oppo-

site sex massage tantamount to criminal sexual activity.
In the landmark case of Lancaster v. Municipal Court for the Beverly Hills Judicial District of Los Angeles County, 494 P.2d 681 (Calif.
1972), the Supreme Court of California had occasion to review a challenge to a massage ordinance similar to that involved in the instant
case.

The court examined the municipality's purpose and objective in

enacting the massage ordinance and concluded:
• • • the purpose of the ordinance in question was not to
regulate the operation of massage parlors but was aimed
at making the task of the police department and sheriff's
office easier in their fight against prostitution and
lewd conduct.
We are satisfied that the ordinance is a
regulation of the criminal aspects of sexual conduct. At
494 P.2d 683-684. (Emphasis added.)
The Lancaster court,

faced with a preemption argument similar to

that contended for herein, continued its analysis and held:
We conclude that the Los Angeles ordinance which is a
regulation of sexual conduct must be held invalid because
the state has preempted the criminal aspects of sexual
activity. At 494 P.2d 684.
The court in Lancaster based its conclusion on two grounds,
mo~e

the

broad being that there is no room for a supplementary or complemen-

tary local ordinance where the subject matter of the ordinance has been
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fully occupied by the State, and the more narrow being that local ordinances in conflict with general state law are void.

(See, Lancaster,

494 P.2d at 682.)
The Utah rule with respect to preemption appears to be a hybrid of
the California position announced in Lancaster.

In State v. Allred, 430

P.2d 371, reversed at 437 P.2d 434 (Utah 1968) (hereinafter "Allred II"),
the Utah Supreme Court adopted the position that local ordinances regulating the same subject matter as state laws are valid so long as the
two a re harmonious and cons is tent.

In this regard, the court stated:

The mere fact that an act denounced as a crime under the
ordinance which is not denounced as a crime under the
statute would not necessarily render the act under the
ordinance inconsistent with the statute whereas here the
ordinance is within scope of the state law dealing with
the same related subject of sexual offenses and is in no
way repugnant to, but on the other hand is in harmony
with the state laws. We believe the ordinance is consistent with the statutes pertaining to sex offenses. At
437 P.2d 436. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the test applied in Allred II, whether the local ordinance is
"harmonious" and "consistent" with the general state law, is much the
same as the more narrow of the two grounds which served as the basis for
the Lancaster court's decision.
In the same year that the Allred II decision was handed down, the
Utah Supreme Court had occasion to review another preemption case,
v. Salt Lake City, 445 P. 2d 691 (Utah 1968).
and clarified the holding in Allred II.

~

There, the Court refined

Still abiding to the harmonious-

conflicting test announced in the prior opinion, the Court defined what
it meant by "conflict:"
• • the invalidity arises,
not from conflict of
language, but from the inevitable conflict of jurisdiction which would result from dual regulations covering
the same ground. Only by such a broad definition of
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"conflict" is it possible to confine local legislation to
its proper field of supplementary regulation. At 445 Pc
2d 694. (Emphasis addede) _
In Allgood v. Larsen, 545 P.2d 530 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme
Court again defined and somewhat enlarged the preemption test set forth
in Allred II.

There, the Court addressed a Salt Lake City ordinance

making criminal trespass a Class B misdemeanor and contrasted it with
general state law which, at § 76-6-206(3) of the Utah Criminal Code, set
out the same offense as only an infraction, for which no jail sentence
could be imposed.

The defendant, having been convicted under the ordi-

nance and sentenced to jail, sought a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

The Utah

Supreme Court, in upholding the issuance of the Writ, held as follows:
The District Court ruled "that since the State Law provides no jail sentence for trespass, which is classified
as an 'infraction,' that the city cannot impose a greater
sentence. than that provided by state law, and it is for
that reason that the Court grants the petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus." With this we agree and affirm the
trial court • • • .
Salt Lake City seeks to exceed the
public policy declared by the legislature relating to a
new class of offense. It does not have that power of
amendment. At 545 P.2d 532. (Emphasis added.)
The most recent Utah case and that completing the second phase of
the hybrid approach with respect to preemption, Layton City v. Speth,
578 P. 2d 828

(Utah 1978), appears to adopt the more broad of the two

grounds set forth in Lancaster.

There, the Utah Supreme Court ruled,

given the State' .s full occupation of the subject matter regulated by the
challenged ordinance,

that the municipality, under its general police

power, did not even have the authority to copy the statute.

In this

regard, the court stated:
The State of Utah has enacted statutes controlling the
sale, gift, or use of controlled substances • • • [t]he
city has no power or authority to copy the statute in its
ordinance. At 578 P.2d 829.
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The Layton City decision, therefore, is grounded on the same basic principle announced in Lancaster:

that there is no room for a supplementary

or complementary local ordinance where the subject matter of the ordinance has been fully occupied by the state.

Moreover,

the court, in

Layton City, went so far as to say that the municipality could not even
"copy" the statute.
First,
refined
§

applying the more narrow approach taken in Allred II, as

in Salt Lake City and Allgood,

supra, appellants submit that

15-18-5 ( 1) of the massage ordinance must fail as being inconsistent

and in conflict with general state law.
As stated earlier in this point, and as the court concluded under
nearly identical facts in Lancaster, the opposite sex massage pro hi bition of § 15-18-5(1), although contained within a licensing ordinance,
is

properly characterized as

activity.

a criminal ordinance regulating sexual

Criminal sexual activity is comprehensively dealt with in the

Utah Criminal

Code at § 76-5-401 et seq. and at § 76-10-1301 et seq.

Nowhere therein is the simple act of giving a massage to a person of the
opposite sex made criminal.

Indeed, criminal sexual activity as defined

in § 76-10-1301, UCA, even under the most tortured interpretation, does
not include massages:
"Sexual Activity" means intercourse or any sexual act involving the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus
of ano-ther person, regardless of the sex of either participant.
The issue, under the Allred II test, is whether§ 15-18-5(1), which
prohibits opposite sex massage as criminal sexual activity, is inconsistent with or in conflict with general state law, which excludes massages
from the definition of criminal sexual activity.
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In Allred II, the Utah Supreme Court found no inconsistency between
general state law proscribing prostitution and the city ordinance, which
made it an offense to direct or offer to direct any person to any place
for the purpose of committing any lewd act or act of sexual intercoursee
The distinction between Allred II and
obvious.

the

instant case, however,

is

In Allred II, both the ordinance and the statutes specific-

ally, directly and consistently dealt with criminal sexual activity as
defined by state law, whereas in the instant case, the massage ordinance
deals with opposite sex massages as criminal sexual activity and state
law makes no mention of massages and does not even include massages
within the definition of criminal sexual activityo

So that under the

massage ordinance, a new class of offense is created 9 amending general
state law

the exact problem posed in Allgood -- and thus, unlike the

situation in Allred II, the massage ordinance and state law are inherently contradictory and cannot be harmonized, so that state law must be
said to preempt § 15-18-5(1) of the massage ordinance.
Next, applying the most recent and broader approach taken in Layton
City,

§

empted

15-18-5 ( 1) of the massage ordinance is even more clearly preby

the

comprehensive

sexual activity.

general

state

laws

regulating

criminal

If the County is without authority to even copy the

state prostitution laws,

it

is

surely without authority to enact an

ordinance that is inconsistent with said state laws.
Additionally, although perhaps not of the precedential value of a
Utah Supreme Court opinion, further support for appellants' contention
that

§

15-18-5(1)

is

preempted

County, Civil No. 216089 (1974).

can

be

found

in Jensen v. Salt Lake

There, with the Honorable Stewart M.

Hanson, presiding Judge, the Third Judicial District Court ruled in its
Memorandum Decision, entered March 19, 1974, that:
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The evidence indicated that basically the purpose for enacting the ordinance was to control prostitution, which
illegal practice is already covered by the criminal laws
of the State of Utah, and an attempt to regulate it by
the above-ref erred-to ordinance would be a contravention
of the state law. (Emphasis added.)
The County appealed to the Utah Supreme CourtG
County, 530 P.2d 3 (Utah 1974) .)

(See Jensen v. Salt Lake

There, the Court found the massage

ordinance invalid and unenforceable on grounds of vagueness and improper
exercise of the police power and, having made that finding, did not have
occasion to reach the preemption question.

Judge Stewart M. Hanson's

decision, though, was not reversed, and appellants submit that it still
remains of significance in this Court's determination of the same issue.
In sum as to Point II, applying any or all of the approaches taken
in Lancaster, Allred II, Salt Lake City, Allgood, Layton City, or Jensen,
and given the kind of inconsistency between the massage ordinance and
state laws regulating criminal sexual activity, the state laws must be
said to preempt the massage ordinance insofar as the two are in conflict,

so

that

§

15-18-5 ( 1)

of

the massage ordinance must be found

invalid and unenforceable.

POINT III
SECTION 15-18-5(1) OF THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE IS IN VIOLATION OF THE UTAH ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACT AND UTAH CIVIL
RIGHTS STATUTES.
Section 15-18-5(1) of the massage ordinance, as already stated, prohibits licensed masseurs from performing massages on persons of the opposite sex.

Sections 15-18-7 and 15-18-8 provide for civil sanctions,

such as license suspension and revocation, and penal sanctions, such as
fines and imprisonment, respectively.
mandate of

the massage

Thus, in order to comply with the

ordinance and avoid its sanctions, a massage
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parlor is compelled to hire its male and female employees in proportion
to the sexual composition of its

clientele~

In other words, if all of a

massage parlor's customers are male, (see, Stipulated Facts, no. 7, "The
vast majority of massage parlor patrons are men.")

then the massage

parlor must employ only male masseurs, even though female masseurs are
equally qualified and even though female masseurs outnumber their male
counterparts thirteen to one
approximately

140

licensed

(~,

Stipulated Facts, no. 6, "There are

masseurs

number, approximately 130 are women.")
nance

require an impossibility

in

Salt

Lake

County;

of

this

Not only does the massage ordi-

a mere ten

licensed male masseurs

cannot meet the employment needs of all the massage establishments --but
appellants submit that it requires a violation of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act.

A massage parlor must hire its employees not on the basis

of their respective qualifications but on the sole basis of their sex.
Specifically, any massage parlor that adheres to the mandate of the
massage ordinance violates § 34-35-6, UCA, of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act, which states in relevant part as follows:
(1)

It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment
practice:
(a)

Furthermore,

For an employer to refuse to hire • • • because of • • • sex .
(Emphasis added.)
the Salt Lake County Commissioners,

discriminatory ordinance,

in enacting the

have violated the same section of the Utah

Antidiscrimination Act, at part (e), which states as follows:
( e)

For any person, whether an employer, an employment
agency, a labor organization, or employees or
members thereof, to aid, abet, incite, compel or
otherwise coerce the doing of an act defined in this
section to be a discriminatory or unfair employment
practice or to obstruct or prevent any person from
complying with the provisions of this chapter • • • •
(Emphasis added.)
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Thus, in order for a massage parlor to remain in business and in
compliance with the massage ordinance, it must consciously and openly
discriminate on the basis of sex in employment, thereby violating § 3435-6(1) of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act.

Moreover, the massage ordi-

nance that compels such a discriminatory employment practice and prevents employers from complying with the terms of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act

is itself in violation of § 34-35-6(1) (e) of the same Act.

The respondents may very well contend that, given the massage ordinance's prohibition of opposite sex massages, sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for massage parlors and, therefore, within an exception of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act found at§ 34-35-6(2)(a).

Such

reasoning, however, is circular and without merit in that it presumes
the ordinance valid, and once valid, the occupational qualification bona
fide, and once the· occupational qualification bona fide, the ordinance
creating it valid, and so on.

The questions as to the validity of the

ordinance and the bona fide-ness of the occupational qualification are
separate and involve different considerations.
Section 34-35-6(2)(a) states the bona fide occupational qualification exception as follows:
(2)

It shall not be a discriminatory or unfair practice:
(a)

For an employer to hire and employ employees on
the basis of • • • sex • • • where • • • sex is
a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal business or enterprise or essential to the motif, culture or atmosphere displayed, illustrated or promoted by
such particular business or enterprise. (Emphasis added.)

In the instant case,

it is not "normal" for a massage parlor to

hire male masseurs merely because its customers are male, nor it is
"essential" to the "atmosphere" that male masseurs perform massages on
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to

the present operation of massage parlors in Salt Lake County, most of
which administer massages without regard to sex.

Thus sex, as an occu-

pational qualification, in this instance, is invalid -- not bona fide -and the massage ordinance must be struck down as violative of the Utah
Antidiscrimination Act.
Moreover, not only would a massage parlor be required to discriminate on the basis of sex in employment in order to comply with the
massage ordinance,

it would also have to discriminate on the basis of

sex in rendering services.
female masseurs

For example, if a massage parlor had only

in its employ, or only female masseurs on duty,

business would be forced to deny its services to male customers.

the

Such a

denial of services on the basis of sex is a violation of Utah's civil
rights

statutes,

of which § 13-7-3,

UCA, states in relevant part as

follows:
Equal right in business establishments, places of public
accommodation, and enterprises regulated by the state. -All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are
free and equal and are entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, goods and
services in all business establishments and in all places
of public accommodation, and by all enterprises regulated by the state of every kind whatsoever, without
discrimination on the basis of • • . sex • . . • (Emphasis added.)
The case of Cianciolo v. City Council of Knoxville, 376 F.Supp. 719
(D.C. Tenn.

1974), is on point.

There,

the court examined a massage

ordinance similar to that in the instant case under the federal Civil
Rights Act of 1964,
rights statutes.

which Act

served as the model for Utah's civil

The court found that sex was not a bona fide occupa-

tional qualification and further concluded that:
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The [massage] ordinance • • • fails to recognize that not
all female masseuses will abuse a historically legitimate
occupation when permitted to massage clients of the opposite sex • • • •
The infirmity is that this presumption is grounded on an individual's sex.
In conclusion,
it would appear that [the ordinance] does not comply with
the spirit, if not the letter, of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. At 376 F.Supp. 723.
(Emphasis added.)
Just as the massage ordinance was invalid as violative of the federal
Civil Rights Act in Cianciolo, the massage ordinance challenged in the
instant case is also invalid as violative of Utah's civil rights statutes.
In conclusion as to Point III,

§ 15-18-5 ( 1)

of the massage ordi-

nance, which creates discriminatory qualifications regarding employment
and rendering of services, must be found invalid and unenforceable in
violation of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act and the Utah civil rights
statutes.

POINT IV
SECTION 15-18-5(1) OF THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE DENIES EQUAL
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN VIOLATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
The appellants,
Smith v. Keater,

in asserting Point IV,

419 U.S.

1043,

95 S.Ct.

Rubenstein v. Township of Cherry Hill,
L.Ed.2d 1136 (1974);
S.Ct.

237,

acknowledge the cases of

613,

417 U.S.

42 L.Ed.2d 636

(1974);

963, 94 S.Ct. 3165, 41

and Kisley v. City Falls Church, 409 U.S. 907, 93

34 L.Ed.2d 169

(1972),

appeals from state court decisions

upholding the federal constitutionality of massage ordinances similar to
the massage ordinance in the instant case, in which the United States
Supreme Court dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.
appellants
332,

further

95 S.Ct.

2281,

acknowledge

that under Hicks v. Miranda,

45 L.Ed.2d 223

(1975),

4 22 U.S.

the United States Supreme
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The

Court's dismissal of an appeal for want of a substantial federal question is to be treated as dispositive on the merits of the issues raised.
The appellants, however, respectfully submit that the United States
Supreme Court's decisions in the above-cited massage ordinance cases are
in error.

Realizing that this Court is not the proper forum for seeking

a reversal of the United States Supreme Court as to that Court's interpretation of the United States Constitution (see, Oregon v. Haas, 420
U.. S. 714, at- 719, f.n. 4, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.,2d 570 (1975)), the
appellants,

for purposes of preserving

the issues raised for appeal

only, briefly set forth the points of contention as follows:
(1)

That

§

15-18-5(1) creates a sex-based classification without a

compelling state interest therefor, contrary to the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
(2)

That

§

15-18-5(1-) creates a sex-based classification without a

reasonable basis therefor, contrary to the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
(3)

That

§

15-18-5(1) creates a classification in the exercise of

the fundamental right to pursue a legitimate occupation including licensed masseurs and excluding licensed persons who
practice

the healing arts or professions,

contrary to the

Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
(4)

That

§-

15-18-5 (1) creates an arbitrary and irrational classi-

fication including

licensed masseurs and excluding licensed

persons who practice the healing arts or professions;
(5)

That § 15-18-5(1) abridges the fundamental right to pursue a
legitimate

occupation without

a

compelling

state

interest

therefor, contrary to the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment;
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(6)

That there are less restrictive means of achieving the same
objective sought by

§

15-18-5(1) and the failure to use such

means is a denial of due process, contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment;
(7)

That §

and

15-18-5 (1)

creates an irrebuttable presumption that

persons massaging persons of the opposite sex will engage in
"

illicit sexual activity and such presumption is irrational and
denies

due

process,

contrary

to

the Fourteenth Amendment.

POINT V
SECTION 15-18-5(1) OF THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE DENIES EQUAL
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND PUNISHES PERSONS
WITHOUT TRIAL OR CONVICTION IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
The appellants contend that, while in some instances the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the United States Constitution
may be helpful to state courts in interpreting their own constitutions,
the former in no way binds the latter.

(See, Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S.

714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975);
Nielson, 572 P.2d 485 (Colo. 1977).)

City and County of Denver v.

The appellants submit that this is

especially true where, as in the instant case, the language of the two
constitutions differs significantly.
Unlike

the United

States

Constitution which,

absent

the Equal

Rights amendment, has no constitutional laugage raising sex-based classifications to the level of "strict scrutiny," the Constitution of the
State of Utah does have such

lang~age.

Specifically, Article IV, Sec-

tion I provides in relevant part as follows:
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•
e
Both male and female citizens of this State shall
enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights
and privileges.,
Q

Given this constitutional protection of sexual equality, any state intrusion upon equality of the sexes should be subjected to strict scrutiny,
with the burden on the state to show a compelling state interest furthered by such intrusion.
The application of the strict scrutiny-compelling state interest
test in matters involving sex-based classifications, such as that presented

by

§ 15-18-5(1),

is

consistent with and mandated by the Utah

Supreme Court's decision in Beehive Med. Electronics v. Industrial Commission,

583 P. 2d 53

(Utah 1978).

There, the Court characterized the

protection against discrimination based on sex founded in the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article IV, Section I, as a "precious right
in our basic law."

At 583 Po 2d 60 o

As such a ".precious right," any

abridgements thereof should undergo the Court's most careful scrutiny,
with

only

those

abridgements

of

a

legitimate and

compelling nature

surviving.
Additionally, as § 15-18-5(1) creates a classification in the exercise of the fundamental right to pursue a legitimate occupation which
includes licensed masseurs and which also includes licensed persons who
practice the healing arts or professions, and further as said section
suppresses and prohibits the fundamental right to pursue the commercial
enterprise

of

administering

massages,

a

legitimate

occupation,

the

strict scrutiny-compelling state interest test is mandated by the Utah
Constitution, Article I, Sections 2, 7 and 24.
The

strict

scrutiny-compelling

state

interest

analysis has been

applied in several cases involving classifications based on sex.

(See,
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Mercer v. Board of Trustees, 538 S.W.2d 201 (Texas 1976);

Long v. Cali-

fornia State Personnel Board, 116 Cal. Rptr. 562 (Calif. 1974);
erty v. Daley,
372

F.Supp.

(D.C. Mont.
ciation,

370 F.Supp. 338 (D.C.

1015

(D.C.

1975);

1974);

1974);

Johnston v. Hodges,

U.S. v. Reiser,

394 F. Supp. 1060

Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Asso-

377 F.Supp.

(Del. 1974);

Ky.

Ill.

Daugh-

1233

(D.C.

Kan.

1974);

M. v. M., 321 A.2d 115

Anderson v. City of Detroit, 221 N.W.2d 168 (Mich. 1974);

Darrin v. Gould,

540 P.2d 882 (Wash.

1975);

and Sail'er Inn, Inc. v.

Kirby, 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971).)
Directly on point are several cases involving massage ordinances
nearly identical to that in the instant case, where the strict scrutinycompelling

state

interest

test has

been applied with the universal

result that the ordinances were found unconstitutional.
In Cianciolo v. City of Knoxville, supra, the court held:
As the commercial enterprise of administering massages
is, per se, a legitimate occupation, the city in this instance must show a compelling state interest before this
ordinance. can be upheld • . • • It is settled law that
before a regulation can withstand judicial examination
under the compelling state interest, the state must show
that there was no alternative method of achieving the objective sought • • • • It appears that in this instance
there is available to the City viable, existing alternative methods of curtailing sexually illicit conduct -alternatives that place a less onerous burden on those
who practice [massages] • •
(Emphasis added.)
In Corey v. City of Dallas, 352 F.Supp. 977 (D.C. Texas 1972), reversed on the issue of standing at 492 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1974), the
court held:
This court concludes that Corey has a fundamental right
to operate a massage establishment in the City of Dallas.
Any ordinance which infringes on Corey's right to do
business through a classification based on sex which restricts who Corey may employ in his business contravenes
the Fourteenth Amendment unless the objective of the ordinance is supported by a compelling state interest. • • •
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This court finds that there are practicable alternative
methods available to the City of Dallas which would
achieve the same ~bjective of this ordinance. Therefore,
the objective of this statutory classification based on
sex is not supported by a compelling state interest.
At 352 F.Supp. 981 and 983. (Emphasis added.)
In the instant case, the County cannot meet the demanding burden of
the strict scrutiny-compelling state interest test.

The admitted pur-

pose of § 15-18-5(1) of the massage ordinance is to reach the criminal
offense of prostitution and,
alternative methods

since there are several other existing

available to the defendants,

such as the several

statutes and ordinances outlawing prostitution and illicit sexual activity

(~,

Point I-B (i)),

the interest furthered by the ordinance is

duplicative and in no manner compelling.
Even if the lesser standard of the "rational basis" test is applied
to the massage ordinance in question, it would fail as unnecessary, irrational and creating an irrebuttable presumption.

In J.S.K. Enterprises,

Inc. v. City of Lacey, 492 P.2d 600 (Wash. 1971), the court applied the
rational basis test to a massage ordinance very similar to that in the
instant case and held:
Massage is one of the oldest forms of therapy. When properly administered in an appropriate case, it can be one
of the most useful forms of therapy. To deny all rnassagists the right to practice their profession because some
individuals utilize a massage parlor as a subterfuge to
perform lewd acts for compensation would require stereotyping of the worst kind. It is saying, in effect, that
all massagists can be judged to be lewd if given the opportunity and therefore they cannot massage members of
the opposite sex. Not only is this discrimination as to
both sexes of massagists but it would deny the people who
need their services the opportunity to select the best
qualified massagist available to them • • • • We therefore hold that the ordinance is an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the police power.
At 492 P.2d 607.
(Emphasis added.)
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Similarly,

in

City and County of Denver v. Nielson,

supra,

the

Supreme Court of Colorado, addressing itself to the constitutionality of
a massage ordinance nearly identical to that in the instant case, applied the rational basis test under the Colorado Constitution and held:
The Denver ordinance is not a reasonable regulation. ..!!_
creates an unreasonable, arbitrary, and unconstitutional
conclusive presumption. • • •
The ordinance is unduly
oppressive to legitimate massage practitioners and goes
beyond the means reasonably necessary to accomplish the
legitimate
objective
of
preventing
illicit
sexual
behavior.
Alternative
constitutionally
permissible
methods of curtailing sexually illicit behavior are
available to legislative bodies. At 572 P.2d 486. (Emphasis added.)
In the instant case, the massage ordinance should fail for the same
reasons articulated in the above-cited cases.

The manner in which the

massage ordinance attempts to regulate illicit sexual activity is unreasonable and unnecessary given the available alternatives and further it
creates an unreasonable, arbitrary, irrebuttable presumption that all
masseurs will commit illegal sexual acts but for the prohibition to the
contrary.
Speaking to the issue of the creation of irrebuttable presumptions,
then-Justice

Ellett,

writing

a

concurring opinion in Jensen v. Salt

Lake County, supra, summarized the Court's findings as follows:
The requirements of the [massage] ordinance in my
opinion are too severe to be considered reasonable
requirements for a license to operate as a masseuse.
There surely are masseuses who are moral women.
At
530 P.2d 4. (Emphasis added.)
The appellan1:s,

echoing the words of Justice Ellett, submit that

there are masseuses who are moral women, and further submit that any
massage ordinance which conclusively and irrebuttably presumes that all
masseuses are immoral is violative of the Utah Constitution.
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In addition to the above constitutional analyses, the most recent
Utah Supreme Court case on massage ordinances, Hart Heal th Studio v.
Salt Lake County, supra, provides a constitutional ruling that, appellants submit,

is controlling in the instant casee

There,

the Utah

Supreme Court was presented with an earlier version of the Salt Lake
County massage ordinance, which provided in part for an annual license
fee

of

$5,000.00 for

any massage parlor employing a masseur whose

massage parlor license had been revoked within the past 12 months.

The

Court, in examining this provision, stated:
We also believe this section of the ordinance is
somewhat like the old bills of pains and penal ties
(special acts of a legislature which inflict punishment on persons without any conviction by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings), prohibited by
the Utah and U.S. Constitutions (see, Article I, Section 18, Utah Constitution; and Article I, Section
10, U.S. Constitution.) The ordinance clearly penalizes the masseur and his employer without a trial or
conviction, and thus is clearly invalid and unenforceable under the constitutional provisions cited.
At 577 P.2d 118. (Emphasis added.)
In the instant case, a type of punishment without trial or conviction, on a somewhat larger scale than that in Hart Health Studio, is
presented by the massage ordinance in question.

Given the conclusive

presumption that all masseurs administering opposite sex massages will
engage in illicit sexual activity, but for the prohibition against opposite sex massages, all masseurs are being conclusively presumed guilty
and punished without trial or conviction.

Whereas in Hart, the punish-

ment was an annual license fee of $5,000.00, in the instant case, the
punishment is being driven out of business.,

Such punishment without

trial or conviction is contrary to Article I, Section 18 of the Utah
Constitution.
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In conclusion as to Point V,

§

15-18-5(1) of the massage ordinance

must fail under either or both of the strict scrutiny-compelling state
interest test and the rational basis test under the due process and
equal protection requirements of Article I, Sections 2, 7 and 24 of the
Utah

Constitution,

and further must fail

as establishing punishment

without a trial or conviction under Article I, Section 18 of the Utah
Cons ti tu tion.

POINT VI
SECTION 15-18-3 OF THE
ARBITRARY AND IRRATIONAL
AGE IN VIOLATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

MASSAGE ORDINANCE CREATES AN
CLASSIFICATION ON THE BASIS OF
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 2 AND 24 OF

Section 15-18-3 of the massage ordinance provides that an applicant
for a masseur's license must be at least 21 years of age.

The appel-

lants contend that there is no rational basis in support of such a classi f ication.

The respondents suggest that there are two reasons for the classification set forth in

§

15-18-3:

because "a 17-year-old girl was arrested

in a Massage Parlor, acting as a masseuse, unlicensed," (see, Stipulated
Facts);

and because persons under the age of 21 generally lack the

necessary experience and maturity to conduct the business of a masseur
(see, Defendants' Trial Memorandum, Point VII).
As to the concern of "17-year-old girls" acting as masseuses, the
problem associated therewith would be alleviated by setting the age
requirement at 18 years.

The apparent concern is that runaways will

turn to massage parlors for employment unless the age requirement is set
at 21 years, but this ignores the fact that 18 years of age is the age
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of majority in the State of Utah.

(See, §

15~2-1

9 UCA,

"the period of

minority extends in males and females to the age of eighteen years.")
Once an individual

obtains the age of

considered a runaway;

majority~

he cannot legally be

thus the age requirement need only be set at 18

years to resolve this problem.
Next, the contention that an individual must be 21 years of age in
order to ''handle" the responsibilities of a masseur is totally without
merit.

The State of Utah regulates the licensing of nurses whose respon-

sibilities are far more substantial than those of a masseur and no age
requirement is provided for.

(See, § 58-31-9, UCA, "Registered Nurses

-- Requirements for license," and § 58-31-10, UCA, "Practical Nurses -Requirements for license.")
the

ages

Many nurses are licensed every year between

of 18 and 21 years;

and if they are able to assume their

responsibilities at that age, then there is no reason to require more of
masseurs ..
The

standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court,

which classifications based on age are judged,
test.

by

is the rational basis

(See, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,

at 314 (1976);

~'

contra, Nelson v. Miwa, 546 P.2d 1005 (1976), which

case applies the strict scrutiny-compelling state interest analysis.)
Similarly, the Utah courts have applied the rational basis standard to
classifications which treat one group of persons different from another
group.

(See,

Crowder v. Salt Lake County,

Child v. City of Spanish Fork,

538

McGinn, 524 P.2d 323 (Utah 1974);

P.2d

552

184

P.2d

(Utah

646
1975);

(Utah 1976);
Leatham v.

Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883 (Utah

1974), appeal dismissed 95 S.Ct. 24, 419 U .. S. 810, 42 L .. Ed.2d 37, reh.
denied 95 S.Ct. 645, 419 U.S. 1050, 42 L.Ed.2d 658 (1975).)
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In the instant case, respondents contend that two bases serve for
the age classification presented by § 15-18-3 of the massage ordinance:
the concern for runaway minors and the concern that a person must be 21
years of age to handle the responsibilities of a masseur.

The appel-

lants submit, as stated earlier in this Point, that neither basis is
rationally related to

the County's

purpose·,

as

18-year-olds are not

minors and, as persons between the ages of 18 years and 20 years, are
capable of assuming the responsibilities of a masseur.
In conclusion as to Point VI, § 15-18-3 of the massage ordinance
creates an arbitrary and unreasonable classification on the basis of
age, not rationally related to the County's purpose, in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Sections 2 and 24 of the Utah Constitution.

POINT VII
SECTIONS 15-18-1(2), 15-18-1(4), AND 15-18-4 OF
MASSAGE ORDINANCE. ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
UNCERTAIN.

THE
AND

Sections 15-18-1 (2), 15-18-1 (4), and 15-18-4 fail to give adequate
notice of what is necessary in order to comply with the requirements of
the massage ordinance.
In

Jensen v. Salt Lake County,

supra,

similar contentions as to

vagueness were raised and the Court set the test as follows:
The trial court was of the opinion that the language of
the ordinance was to vague and uncertain as to render it
invalid.
We conclude that that determination by the
trial court was correct. A person who might wish to enter the field covered by the ordinance would be unable to
determine from its wording what qualification or skill
would be necessary to qualify for a license. It is noted
that the ordinance uses the term "massage therapist" but
nowhere is that term defined. At 530 P.2d 4.
(Emphasis
added.)
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In the instant case, § 15-18-1(2) of the massage ordinance uses the
term "healing arts" but nowhere is that term defined..

This presents

much the same problem as that presented by the undefined tenn, nmassage
therapist," since the person who might wish to enter the field of healing arts instead of that of a masseur has no idea of what the ordinance
has in mind..

For the same reasons stated in Jensen, § 15-18-1 (2) is so

vague and uncertain as to render that section invalid.
Section 15-18-1(4) of the massage ordinance is similarly troubled
by the use of uncertain terminology.

Section 15-18-1(4) provides the

definition of "employee" and proceeds to define it as meaning, among
other things, "owner" and "manager."

It is confusing as to how one can

be both the owner and the employee at the same time.

Such a definition

is contrary to common usage and, as such, the ordinary person is unable
to determine who is considered an employee and who is not..

Thus,

§

15-

18-1(4) is so uncertain as to render it invalid ..
Additionally,

§

15-18-4 sets standards so vague as to be outside

the ordinary person's ability to determine what is required for compliance with the massage ordinance.

Section 15-18-4 provides the require-

ment that the premises of massage parlors must be "sanitary," but does
so in such vague terms that an applicant is not put on notice as to what
is required.

Section 15-18-4 states in relevant part as follows:

• a license shall be granted only after a finding by
the Salt Lake City-County Baord of Health that the proposed premises are sanitary enough to conduct business
therein without jeopardizing the public health.. (Emphasis added.)
No standards are specified so as to give an applicant any indication of what is meant by "sanitary enough. n

Without more specificity,

the ordinary person is unable to determine what requirements must be
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met, and thus, under Jensen, § 15-18-4 of the massage ordinance is rendered invalid.
Problems of vagueness, similar to those in the instant case, arose
in New York

State Society of Medical

Masseurs, Inc., et al. v. City of

New York, et al., 74 Misc.2d 573 (N.Y. 1973), wherein the court had occasion to review New York City's massage parlor ordinance.

There, faced

with the wording "may license massage ins ti tu tes upon receipt of approval from all necessary governmental agencies having jurisdiction," the
court ruled:
• the very failure to set standards for the enforcement of the statute (citations omitted) makes the statute
susceptible of discriminatory enforcement and therefore
void on its face. At 870.
The court further stated:
It is not necessary to prove that this broad statute is
likely to be enforced in a manner to harass persons who
are not intended to fall under its structures.
It is
sufficient if 'the broad prohibitive language of the
statute together with the lack of any defined standards
for judging violations renders it peculiarly susceptible
to arbitrary enforcement' (citations omitted). At 870.
In the

instant case,

the massage ordinance in question presents

similar broad language with no defined standards for judging violations.
The appellants submit that this absence of defined standards will allow
and promote arbitrary enforcement of the provisions of the massage ordinance.
In sum as to Point VII, § § 15-18-1 (2), 15-18-1 (4), and 15-18-4 of
the massage ordinance are

so vague and uncertain

that they fail to

impart adequate notice of what requirements must be met in order for
compliance, and said sections must be found invalid and unenforceable.
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POINT VIII
SECTIONS 15-18-5(1) AND 15-18-8 PROVIDE FOR INCHOATE
OFFENSES IN CONFLICT WITH GENERAL STATE LAWS SETTING
FORTH INCHOATE OFFENSESe
Section 15-18-5(1) provides in part:
It shall
to cause
ness, an
person of

be unlawful for any massage establishment
or permit in or about his place of busiemployee to administer a massage upon any
the opposite sex. (Emphasis added.)

Section 15-18-8 additionally sets forth penal sanctions for persons convicted of violations of the massage ordinance, including violations of
the above-stated

§

15-18-5(1).

Since it is the combined effect of the two sections to make an
owner of a massage parlor criminally liable for the acts of his employees, even though the owner does nothing more than "permit" employees to
engage in prohibited acts, the two sections are in conflict with general
state criminal laws setting forth the inchoate offense of conspiracye
Under the Utah Criminal Code, at

§

76-4-201, UCA, the elements of

conspiracy are set out as follows:
• • • a person is guilty of conspiracy when he, intending
that conduct constituting a crime be performed, agrees
with one or more persons to engage in or cause the permance of such conduct and any one of them commits an
overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy. . . •
Two of these necessary elements for the crime of conspiracy are circumvented by the massage ordinance's use of the word "permit."

Permit is

defined in Black's Law Dictionary as ". • • to acquiesce, by failure to
prevent," and, therefore, one can perriit certain acts to take place without either "intending that conduct constituting a crime be performed" or
"agreeing" with someone "to cause the performance of such conduct."
In conclusion as to Point VIII, appellants submit that Salt Lake
County's enactment of

§§

15-18-5 (1) and 15-18-8, which make a massage
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parlor owner vicariously liable for the acts of his employees, in effect
establishes the crime of conspiring to commit prohibited acts under the
massage ordinance.

The appellants further submit that §§ 15-18-5(1) and

15-18-8 are inherently contradictory to general state conspiracy laws
and, under the rationale advanced in Point II, supra, said sections must
be

found to be preempted by state law and,

to the extent preempted,

invalid and unenforceable.

POINT IX
SECTION 15-18-5(2) OF THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE IS PREEMPTED
BY STATE LIQUOR LAWS AND MUST BE FOUND INVALID AND UNENFORCEABLE.
Section 15-18-5 (2)

purports to regulate serving, storing and con-

sumption of alcoholic beverages on premises of massage parlors.
respondents have conceded

(~,

As the

Defendants' Memorandum Point VI), said

section is preempted by the comprehensive state liquor laws set out at
Title 32,

Chapters 1 through 10, UCA, under the rationale advanced in

Point II, supra.
More specifically, the State Liquor Control Act makes provision for
"State stores," at § 32-1-36;
duals," at § 32-1-39;
11;
holic

"Sale and delivery of liquor to indivi-

''Manufacture, importation and sale," at § 32-4-

"Consumption on premises," at § 32-4-19;
beverages," at

"Supply of

§

32-7-1;

"Prohibited sale of alco-

"Possession of liquor," at § 32-7-2;

liquor to prohibited persons," at § 32-7-13;

liquor without permit," at § 32-7-25.

and "Having

The appellants submit that the

Liquor Control Act comprehensively deals with intoxicating liquor and
nowhere therein makes it unlawful for a business to possess and consume
liquor on its premises;

selling, yes, but not mere possession and con-

sumption.
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Section 15-18-5(2) of the massage ordinance in no manner addresses
the sale of alcoholic beverages;

instead it outlaws the "serving,"

"storing," and "consumption" of alcoholic beverages on the premises of
massage parlors.

Further,

respondents have made no contention that

massage parlors have in the past or will in the future "sell" alcoholic
beverages ..
The appellants submit that § 15-18-5(2) attempts to create a new
class of offenses, the mere serving, storage or consumption of alcoholic
beverages, and that such is inconsistent to and conflicting with the
offenses set forth by comprehensive state law. The appellants further
submit that under the authorities of Lancaster, supra, Allred II, supra,
Salt Lake City, supra, Allgood, supra, and Layton City, supra, and the
rationale set forth in Point II, supra, said section is preempted and
invalid.,
Further

support

for

appellants'

contention,

and

dealing

more

directly with the subject of intoxicating liquor, is the case of Salt
Lake County v. Liquor Control Commission,

357

P.2d

488

(Utah

1960).

There, the Utah Supreme Court addressed a Salt Lake County ordinance in
conflict with the comprehensive state liquor laws set out in the Liquor
Control Act and reasoned:
a county zoning ordinance in and of itself should
not be permitted to interdict against such sweeping
authority [Liquor Control Commission's], without a further and clear showing that the state's police power is
being abused and exercised in an unreasonable manner. At
490.
The Court, not finding any showing of abuse of the state's police power,
held:
We conclude, therefore, that the local county arms of the
state sovereign must yield to the statewide arm • •
At 490~
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In conclusion as to Point IX, appellants submit that § 15-18-5(2)
of the massage ordinance is inconsistent and in conflict with general
state liquor laws and,
preempted thereby e
ceded

to

this

therefore,

invalid and unenforceable as being

The appellants further submit, as respondents con-

point

at

trial

and

advanced

no

authorities

to

the

contrary, that the lower court's ruling is unsupported by the record on
appeal.

CONCLUSION
For the several reasons

advanced above in Points I through IX,

appellants respectfully request this

Court to reverse the Memorandum.

Decision of the lower court, to grant appellants' motion for summary
judgment, to find §§ 15-18-1(2), 15-18-1(4),

15-18-3, 15-18-4, 15-18-

5(1), 15-18-5(2), 15-18-7, and 15-18-8 of the massage ordinance unlawful
and

unconstitutional,

and

to

issue a permanent

injunction enjoining

respondents from enforcing said sections.

DATED this thirty-first day of March, 1980.

Respectfully submitted,
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